Devon Carbado, a professor at the UCLA School of Law, is a nationally recognized figure in the field of critical race theory and is actively involved in shaping a nationwide discourse on race, identity and the law. Mitu Gulati is a professor at the Duke University School of Law and co-author with Carbado of the new book, Acting White?: Rethinking Race in Post-Racial America (2013, Oxford University Press). This op-ed originally appeared in the Huffington Post on April 4.Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., would have cause for both celebration and concern if he were alive today.
In 2009, Barack Obama was inaugurated as the first black president of the United States. Last year, President Obama won re-election and this year he made history again: He was the first president ever inaugurated on MLK Day. No doubt, many will applaud this convergence. After all, King urged us to judge others based on the content of their character, not the color of their skin. What better evidence of our commitment to do so than Obama's re-election? That's the celebration.
The concern is that, instead of demonstrating that race does not matter, Barack Obama's ascendency to the White House may reveal how much it does. This is not to say that Americans are judging Obama negatively based on the color of his skin (obviously not, given how many of us voted for him). Our point, rather, is that Americans may be judging him based on the content of his racial character or, more crudely, on whether he appears to be "too white," "too black" or "not black enough."
This might strike some as a silly argument, and certainly one that has no real social significance. But the question of whether we are judging Obama based on his racial character (and not just his skin color) has implications for how we understand discrimination and anti-discrimination law.
Skin color is but one basis upon which we racially categorize, and it is not even always the most important basis. We also racially categorize based on names, dress, speech, hair style, professional and social affiliations, political and racial commitments, neighborhood and so on and so forth. The foregoing function as a set of racial criteria people can employ to determine not simply whether a person is black in terms of the color of her skin but whether that person is black in terms of her racial character.
Framing race in this way is important. Few institutions today refuse to hire any African Americans. Law expressly prohibits that form of discrimination and society frowns upon it. The reality today, therefore, is that most employers will hire some African Americans and, given that the diversity is good for business talk, may even do so enthusiastically.
The question is, which African Americans will employers hire? The ones who are racially palatable. Employers can screen their application pool for African Americans who are racially comfortable. These are the "good" blacks. They are black only in terms of the color of their skin. In most other ways, the employer perceives them to be just like whites. The employer can thus profit from their skin color diversity without worrying about whether their racial character will create tension within the institution.
Not so with "bad" blacks. Their racial character is salient. This may be because race really matters to them or because they are identifiably black with respect to their name, where they live, the people with whom they associate, where they go to church, etc. Employers may worry that "bad" blacks will repeatedly play the "race card" (something a "good" black would never do), increasing the likelihood of racial tension and antagonism in the workplace.
Significantly, both categories of African Americans are black in terms of the color of their skin. But the "bad" blacks are blacker because of their perceived racial character. Thus, they are more vulnerable to discrimination than the "good" blacks.
Note how this argument about racial character tracks discrimination on the basis of sex. Few would quarrel with the claim that we judge individuals based not only on whether we perceive them to be men or women but also on their gender character. For example, we differentiate between masculine women and feminine women, often preferring the latter over the former.
A similar point can be made about sexual orientation. We judge people based not only on whether we perceive them to be gay or lesbians but also on the character of their sexual orientation. For example, we differentiate between "straight-acting" gay men and those who are "flamboyantly" gay.
All we are saying is that a dynamic of this sort is at play with race. We judge African Americans based not only on whether we perceive them to be black but also on how black we perceive them to be.
The phenomenon of racial character provides at least a partial explanation for Obama's trajectory. If you don't believe us, believe Obama. Commenting on his first campaign for the White House, Obama noted that "at every stage of the campaign, commentators have deemed me either 'too black' or 'not black enough.'" Obama was aware that people were judging him based on racial character, and not just on the color of his skin.
The concern is that, instead of demonstrating that race does not matter, Barack Obama's ascendency to the White House may reveal how much it does. This is not to say that Americans are judging Obama negatively based on the color of his skin (obviously not, given how many of us voted for him). Our point, rather, is that Americans may be judging him based on the content of his racial character or, more crudely, on whether he appears to be "too white," "too black" or "not black enough."
This might strike some as a silly argument, and certainly one that has no real social significance. But the question of whether we are judging Obama based on his racial character (and not just his skin color) has implications for how we understand discrimination and anti-discrimination law.
Skin color is but one basis upon which we racially categorize, and it is not even always the most important basis. We also racially categorize based on names, dress, speech, hair style, professional and social affiliations, political and racial commitments, neighborhood and so on and so forth. The foregoing function as a set of racial criteria people can employ to determine not simply whether a person is black in terms of the color of her skin but whether that person is black in terms of her racial character.
Framing race in this way is important. Few institutions today refuse to hire any African Americans. Law expressly prohibits that form of discrimination and society frowns upon it. The reality today, therefore, is that most employers will hire some African Americans and, given that the diversity is good for business talk, may even do so enthusiastically.
The question is, which African Americans will employers hire? The ones who are racially palatable. Employers can screen their application pool for African Americans who are racially comfortable. These are the "good" blacks. They are black only in terms of the color of their skin. In most other ways, the employer perceives them to be just like whites. The employer can thus profit from their skin color diversity without worrying about whether their racial character will create tension within the institution.Not so with "bad" blacks. Their racial character is salient. This may be because race really matters to them or because they are identifiably black with respect to their name, where they live, the people with whom they associate, where they go to church, etc. Employers may worry that "bad" blacks will repeatedly play the "race card" (something a "good" black would never do), increasing the likelihood of racial tension and antagonism in the workplace.
Significantly, both categories of African Americans are black in terms of the color of their skin. But the "bad" blacks are blacker because of their perceived racial character. Thus, they are more vulnerable to discrimination than the "good" blacks.
Note how this argument about racial character tracks discrimination on the basis of sex. Few would quarrel with the claim that we judge individuals based not only on whether we perceive them to be men or women but also on their gender character. For example, we differentiate between masculine women and feminine women, often preferring the latter over the former.
A similar point can be made about sexual orientation. We judge people based not only on whether we perceive them to be gay or lesbians but also on the character of their sexual orientation. For example, we differentiate between "straight-acting" gay men and those who are "flamboyantly" gay.
All we are saying is that a dynamic of this sort is at play with race. We judge African Americans based not only on whether we perceive them to be black but also on how black we perceive them to be.
The phenomenon of racial character provides at least a partial explanation for Obama's trajectory. If you don't believe us, believe Obama. Commenting on his first campaign for the White House, Obama noted that "at every stage of the campaign, commentators have deemed me either 'too black' or 'not black enough.'" Obama was aware that people were judging him based on racial character, and not just on the color of his skin.
